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The present Working Paper is the pre- 
ultimate draft of the introductory 
chapter of a volume of proceedings of 
a colloquium on recent developments in 
futures trading to be edited by the 
author. The title of the volume will 
be FUTURES MARKETS - MODELLING MANAG­
ING and MONITORING FUTURES TRADING to 
be published with Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, Spring 1983. Since some refer­
ences to chapters of this volume are 
made in the working paper, a table of 























































































































































































MODELLING, MANAGING, AND MONITORING FUTURES TRADING - 
FRONTIERS OF ANALYTICAL INQUIRY
MANFRED E. STREIT
The more we learn about the world 
and the deeper our learning, the 
more conscious, specific, and 
articulate will be our knowledge 
of what we do not know, our know­
ledge of our ignorance.
(K.R. Popper, 1960)
1. Introduction
1.1. The key questions
The last one and a half decades have witnessed an accelera­
tion of the growth of trading in most conventional futures and 
the spectacular success of some new ventures, particularly 
financial futures. The expansion of futures trading is also 
reflected in the successful launching of new markets away from 
the traditional centres in the United States and England. How­




























































































continental Europe. Possible explanations are : (i) a reduction
of potentially tradeable commodities as a consequence of the 
price controls executed via the Common Agricultural Policy,
(ii) limitations of potential market participation of the banking 
sector due to public regulation, (iii) barriers to entry of 
speculators because of adverse legislation as in the case of the 
German Exchange Act which largely inhibits speculative trading 
in commodities, and (iv), perhaps even more deep-rooted than 
elsewhere, a widespread contempt for and misinterpretation of 
speculation, one of the vital elements in any futures market.
But the forementioned obstacles to futures trading in 
continental Europe have not completely prevented the business 
community from using the markets in London and the United States.1 
Whether the new markets in financial futures in London (London 
International Futures Exchange, LIFE) will attract sufficient 
European users and market makers for it to become more than a 
satellite market to Chicago is still uncertain. This uncertainty 
is rather underlined by the poor performance of trading of finan­
cial futures at the New York Futures Exchange (NYFE), which itself 
also points to the difficulty of predicting the success or failure 
of new markets and new contracts.
As far as the scientific analysis of futures markets is 
concerned, the growth of futures trading has been well matched 
by corresponding research. Particularly in the United States, 
major advances in both empirical as well as purely theoretical 
research have been recorded. And both types of research have 
converged, especially in the analysis of information processing 
via markets. European contributions, although quite important 
in content right from the beginning, so far have been compara­
tively few and largely restricted to English scholars. From 
this point of view, a volume like the present one may perhaps 
stimulate research in futures trading, not least as a market 




























































































the major purpose of this introductory essay to point to frontiers 
of analytical inquiry which partly are revealed by the contribu­
tions to this volume and partly became apparent during the pro­
ceedings of the colloquium at which the contributions were 
initially presented.
The studies of the present volume basically deal with three 
interrelated issues which can be summarized with the following 
questions:
(1) Modelling: To what extent do economic models of futures 
trading cover those aspects of these markets which are 
considered salient in the light of what is known empiri­
cally about these markets?
(2) Managing: Taking into account the answer to the first 
question, what advice can be given to private economic 
agents using futures markets, and to governments trying 
to assess such markets as an allocation device which 
may be a substitute for, or a complement of, some ins­
truments of public policy?
(3) Monitoring: To what extent does the performance of futures 
markets depend on their institutional framework, properties 
of the underlying commodities, the design of the traded 
contracts and on the monitoring of trading via private and 
public regulation?
1.2. The contributions in perspective
Although most contributors to this volume go beyond address­
ing themselves to a single one of the forementioned questions, 





























































































Dealing with the first issue, B.S. YAMEY (chapter 2) con­
fronts some major post-war contributions to the theory of futures 
trading with earlier views. He traces the process of trial and 
error in the development of basic concepts which so far have not 
even led to definite answers to a number of basic questions like 
the relevance of the various forms of hedging, the need for and 
the existence of a risk premium, the interpretation of convenience 
yield, and the analytical value of futures markets statistics.
J.M. BURNS (chapter 3) demonstrates the necessity to reduce the 
degree to which institutional aspects of futures markets are 
abstracted from in theoretical studies. As one important conse­
quence, the presently dominant concept of informational efficiency 
turns out to be only a part, although an important part, of a 
wider concept of market efficiency. Within the context of infor­
mational efficiency, J.E. STIGLITZ (chapter 4) shows that the 
conditions for a revealing full communication equilibrium are 
even more stringent than has been believed. However, his major 
results concern the evaluation of an equilibrium model of futures 
trading with which he analyses the possibilities of producers 
and users of a non-storable commodity to adjust both to price 
and to quantity risk. The contribution by D. LEVHARI and 
M. ROTHSCHILD (chapter 5) basically consists of an attempt to 
discuss futures trading in a wider macroeconomic context. Hedging 
via futures as a market response to the observable increase in 
the variability of interest rates is linked with investment 
behaviour. This allows speculation on possible reactions in terms 
of changes in the interest rate elasticity and the structural 
properties of investment. As far as tests of the validity of 
theoritical propositions are concerned, D. FRIEDMAN, G.W. HARRISON 
and J.W. SALMON (chapter 6) belong to the comparatively small 
number of economists who try to employ the experimental method.
The results obtained for a still narrowly defined experimental 
situation demonstrate sufficiently the potential of this method 
to single out the relative importance of the various determinants 





























































































Related to both the first and the second question is the 
contribution by S.J. TAYLOR (chapter 7). The trading rules 
with which he analyses price series of some London commodity 
futures and of currencies traded in Chicago produce new 
empirical evidence concerning the informational efficiency 
of futures markets. But they can also be considered as more 
sophisticated methods which may help operators to explore pro­
fitable trading opportunities. J. ROLFO and H.B. SOSIN (chapter
8) go beyond the analysis of the riskiness of simple hedges by 
considering a trader who wants to lock in both the cost of 
inputs and the value of outputs. The analysis of five strategies 
which they discuss is designed to take into account, in addition, 
potential margin calls and interest rate risk. Price volatility 
as a problem of public policy is taken up by D.M. NEWBERY (chapter
9) . He offers a model which ultimately allows one to deal with 
the question whether futures markets promise to perform better 
than a marketing board in protecting producers against price 
variations. The answer is shown to depend last but not least on 
whether it is also possible to take into account quantity risks.
B. BROWN (chapter 10) looks at forward and futures trading in 
currencies in order to establish which arbitrage constraints
a domestically-oriented policy may have to face depending upon 
the convertibility of the currencies. It is shown that there 
are more arbitrage opportunities than are usually accounted for 
in the theory of foreign exchange.
Primarily related to the third question are the contributions 
by R.L. SANDOR and H.B. SOSIN (chapter 11) and by D.J.S. RUTLEDGE 
(chapter 12), which analyse the experience of the introduction of 
interest rate futures at two different exchanges. They provide 
first-hand information on the art of contract design and on the 
criteria which may be useful in evaluating proposals for the 
introduction of new futures. Attention is also paid to the 
structure of membership and to the prudential control of brokers 
as possible factors determining success or failure of a new 




























































































differences between public surveillance and regulation of futures 
markets in the U.S. and England, and assesses the validity of 
arguments in favour of public regulation in general. This also 
leads to an investigation of the effectiveness of both the 
existing regulation by public authorities and by the exchanges 
themselves.
2 . Modelling Futures Marketsj_Positive Knowledge and Adequate
Abstraction
Among those aspects of futures trading which represent a 
challenge when trying to model those markets, at least three 
still seem to require further attention: (i) trading motives
and the corresponding variety of transactions, (ii) price forma­
tion and the extent to which it is governed by expectations, and 
(iii) the importance of information for trading and as an element 
in the efficiency of futures markets.
2.1. Trading motives and transaction variety
Right from the beginning of the analysis of futures markets 
and quite inline with the views of the users of these markets, 
attitudes towards risk were considered to be central. Futures 
trading was essentially a risk-shifting operation. At least 
in as much as it was not possible in practice to pool risks 
within the group of hedgers, those who wanted to shed risks had 
to pay a premium to speculators who were prepared to take them 
but were also risk averse on average. When modelling futures 
markets, this view allowed to dichotomize market participants 
accordingly into hedgers and speculators. As discussed by 
B.S. YAMEY (chapter 2), in the post-war period the view gained 
ground that the pursuit of profit, rather than the shifting of 




























































































of new ideas by now seem to have converged to a synthesis in the 
sense that the theory of hedging has become more sophisticated 
and accommodates both risk and return.
The recognition of the profit motive in hedging at the same 
time required to lay stress on the information aspect of futures 
trading. Given the standardization of contracts and the organized, 
highly competitive trading, only an informational advantage could 
serve as a second potential source of systematic returns, besides 
the scarcity rent possibly obtainable by risk bearers. Even if 
they were on average risk neutral and no scarcity rent was distri­
butable, speculators would still have an opportunity to gain from 
the acquisition and use of informational advantages. The impli­
cation for hedging is that the price to be paid for unloading 
risk on to the futures market can, in principle, be reduced by 
information activities. The least a potential hedger can do in 
this respect is to use the information he acquires in the course 
of his business in actuals as a basis for forming his own expec­
tations. They in turn allow him to assess the hedging situation, 
i.e. the current futures price. This approach contrasts with a 
notion of hedging which for a long time dominated the theoretical
interpretation of futures markets. It implied that hedgers always2content themselves with locking in a futures price. What remains 
unsettled, however, is essentially an empirical problem: the 
relative importance of discretionary forms of hedging as opposed 
to routine hedging still has to be established.
In terms of modelling, a further departure from the compara­
tively simple concept of routine hedging should be mentioned. It 
refers to the recognition that the quantity to be hedged is a 
decision variable, instead of always assuming completely hedged 
positions. Particularly in the case of agricultural commodities 
it is evident that a producer has to face not only a price risk 
but also a quantity risk. And, as demonstrated by J.E. STIGLITZ 




























































































rational and depend on the kind of relationship between output 
and price variability. Although the practice of incomplete 
hedging was well known, its recognition as a theoretical issue 
was mainly related to attempts to apply portfolio theory to 
hedging behaviour (e.g. JOHNSON, 1960; RUTLEDGE, 1972).
The easy conceptualisation of a futures market in terms of 
the simple dichotomy between hedging and speculation probably 
also encouraged abstraction from all other types of transactions 
observable on futures markets. And again, these differ in a 
characteristic way from routine hedging and straightforward 
speculation when considering the risks involved and the related 
information activities. There are, first, the possibilities of 
profiting from differences between (i) prices of the same contract 
at different exchanges and (ii) prices of a futures contract and 
the corresponding spot prices, i.e. pure inter-market arbitrage 
and, in the case of storable commodities, inter-temporal arbi­
trage. These transactions are practically riskless if the arbi­
trageur manages to lock in the relevant costs of inter-locational 
and inter-temporal substitution (i.e. transport and storage costs) . 
Second, effective arbitrage in turn opens up possibilities for 
speculating in futures but limiting the risk, i.e. intra-com­
modity, inter-commodity and inter-market spreads in futures as 
opposed to straightforward speculation by holding a completely 
open futures position. The reduction of potential losses results 
from the price link between the two positions of a spread which 
is stabilized via arbitrage based on the corresponding costs of 
substitution (i.e. again transport and storage costs and, in the 
case of inter-commodity spreads, for example the processing or 
transformation costs).
The difficulties in extending the analysis of futures markets 
to such transactions are reflected in at least two shortcomings 
of most available models of futures markets: (i) they are one-
market models, abstracting from the interrelations between 




























































































via substitution possibilities, (ii) they are comparative static 
models, abstracting from inter-temporal relations and from the 
actual trading process. Tentative efforts to overcome this 
limitation (e.g. PESTON and YAMEY, 1960) clearly demonstrate the 
price which most probably would have to be paid in terms of 
highly complex or even indeterminate solutions if the analysis 
were to be extended. But as will be argued here, unless such 
extensions or elaborations were attempted, the speculative 
element in all futures transactions as well as the processing 
and conveying of information would probably have to remain 
inaccessible or elusive.
A discussion of the motives for futures trading would be 
incomplete without reference to tax considerations."' Although 
taxation-induced market participation does not lead to new forms 
of transactions worthy of exploration, it does affect the volume 
and structure of trade. The tax implications of futures trad­
ing may differ for nonspeculative and speculative transactions.
Tax implications of futures trading can be taken into account 
by traders in basically a passive way in their decisions to enter 
the market. However, they may also be used actively to try to 
manipulate the tax burden resulting from other activities. Parti­
cularly spreading can offer an opportunity to manipulate the time 
structure of taxable revenues to the advantage of the taxpayer. 
Depending on the relevant rules of taxation and particularly 
changes in the rules, incentives and disincentives to use futures 
markets for tax purposes may produce additional difficulties for 
the empirical analysis of these markets.
2.2. Expectations and price formation
The modelling of futures trading predominantly within a 
comparative static framework definitely facilitates the analysis, 




























































































on these and other speculative markets: the specific time-struc­
ture which futures transactions normally have. As emphasized 
more recently again by HIRSHLEIFER (1975,1977), trading usually 
consist out of two stages. In a first round a trader establishes 
a position which he hopes to revise at a profit in a later round. 
The obvious but basic conclusion then is that traders tend to be 
induced to take an open position in futures in a discretionary 
way if they anticipate that the current futures price or, in the 
case of hedgers, the difference between two prices (the basis), 
will change, i.e. if they in fact consider the current price to 
be a wrong forecast of the price at maturity of a contract and 
hence of the future spot price (or the futures price at any 
earlier date at which they intend to close out).
If some traders are able to establish, say, a positive posi­
tion at a futures price they consider to be a wrong forecast, the 
above reasoning equally suggests that those who are prepared to 
hold the opposite position, must have expectations which diverge 
both from those implicit in the traded price and those held by 
the other side of the market. In this case it can be demonstrated 
(c.f. STREIT, 1983) that during the period before the maturity of 
a contract trading at "false" prices determined by divergent 
beliefs or expectations is the rule. Only at the maturity of a 
contract is a transient consensus imposed upon traders by the 
facts of the spot market.
This view has interesting implications both for the inter­
pretation of futures prices and also for the modelling of their 
formation. According to this view, prices at which transactions 
have taken place before the maturity of a contract represent wrong 
forecasts of future market conditions to those who have made trans 
actions at those prices. The implicit forecasts have been accept­
able only to those who refrained from trading at those prices.
As far as price changes indicate changes in information situations 



























































































reflect accurately the changes in information. This has the 
following implication. Suppose it turns out, empirically, that 
the futures prices in a particular market over a particular 
period prove to have been good forecasts and that the market 
has to be judged efficient in the informational sense. This 
observed result would have been brought about by the actions 
of market participants who in fact disputed the forecasts im­
plicit in the various futures prices. Thus the favourable 
"performance" of the market would be the unintended outcome of 
numerous decisions of the many participants who traded precisely 
because they considered various prices to be inappropriate and 
unjustified last not least in the light of the information avail­
able to them and who intended to profit from the mistakes. The 
rationale for active market participation differs completely from 
tfhe observable market result. The modelling problem which has 
to be solved conforms to POPPER'S general description of the task 
of theoretical social sciences: "to trace the unintended social
repercussions of intentional human actions" (POPPER, 1948, p. 342).
To fulfill this task seems to be particularly difficult in 
the case of futures trading or, more generally, speculative trad­
ing. if divergent beliefs are essential for such trading, HAWTREY's 
early verdict on the conventional method of bridging the gap 
between individual decisions and market results still holds, 
namely that divergent beliefs represent "a fatal objection to 
the introduction of any aggregates or averages of expectations 
into economic reasoning" (HAWTREY, 1939/40, p. 203). This also 
means that the usual econometric approach of inferring from the 
aggregate performance of such markets how expectations are actual­
ly formed is basically invalidated. It remains to be explored 
whether it is an adequate approximation to segment a futures market 




























































































analyze the consequences of correspondingly segmented expect­
ations (as done e.g. by GOSS and GILES, 1981).
2.3. Information processing and market efficiency
The difficulties of comparative static equilibrium analysis 
in capturing salient features of speculative markets also apply 
to the information activities on these markets. They are part­
icularly well demonstrated by the link between the conveying of 
information and the informational efficiency of markets which 
has been established by an impossibility theorem (e.g. GROSSMAN 
and STIGLITZ, 1980) . The theorem is basically the result of a 
free-rider problem which leads to an erosion of futures markers4as a means for processing and disseminating information. If 
the conditions are such that prices convey all information which 
informed traders collect, other traders can get the information 
free by just observing market prices. Hence speculative markets 
can only exist if they are not informationally efficient. This 
can be modelled by adding sufficient noise to the price signals.
In the meantime, and as demonstrated by J.E. STIGLITZ 
(chapter 4), it has become clear that the assumptions necessary 
to establish the theorem are even more stringent than originally 
thought. However, it can be argued that modelling information 
activities in the conventional (neoclassical) way raises a more 
fundamental problem. The problem results from the abstraction 
from time. Given the time structure of transactions, the infor­
mational externality created via trading can only endanger the 
existence of a speculative market if an informed trader has no 
opportunity of trading before his new informational situation 
has become general. This opportunity to trade at a price which 
is false in the light of his information-based beliefs and to re-trade 
at a profit if his beliefs turn out to be correct, is the greater 




























































































he initially has to share his informational advantage with others.
The dynamic view also leads to the conclusion that speculat­
ive markets cannot be completely efficient at every point in time. 
But whereas in the case of the theorem informational inefficiency 
is a necessary condition for the existence of such markets, in­
efficiency in this view is part of the process of discovery and 
communication of information when considering market dynamics. 
Furthermore the incentive problem is seen differently. In the 
static analysis, it is noise that guarantees a rent distributable 
to informed traders. It must be high enough to cover their in­
formation costs. In a dynamic context, however, inefficiency is 
the result of some traders being able to trade at a temporary 
informational advantage. The derivable profit is a premium for 
being faster in the acquisition and correct reading of new infor­
mation, and also for re-interpreting already available information 
more quickly. The premium is highly uncertain, and is exposed 
to the competitive information activities of other traders. It 
is the competition for a temporary informational monopoly which 
not only determines the informational quality of prices but also 
the speed at which changes in beliefs and underlying information 
are disseminated.
If the above interpretation of the market process from an 
informational point of view comes closer to reality, a further 
modelling problem results. It concerns the relationship between 
informational efficiency and competition. Inefficiency from a 
static point of view reflects in a competitive market the gener­
ated incentives which are the source of its dynamic efficiency. 
What in the static approach is interpreted as a deviation from 
Pareto-optimality (e.g. GROSSMAN, 1976, p. 584; FIGLEWSKI, 1978, 
p. 581) is in the dynamic approach a source of virtue.




























































































an irrelevant fiction" (LACHMANN, 1977, p. 37) but would also 
be undesirable if it could be achieved. If the state of perman­
ent Pareto efficiency were to be used as a (fictitious) refer­
ence point, it would be necessary to establish a kind of optimum 
degree of inefficiency. For the market to fulfill its function 
of collecting and disseminating information, the optimum would 
refer to a balance which had to be struck between the access to 
information premia and their erosion through competition. The 
same applies to the function of facilitating transactions. In 
order to recruit sufficient support from potential market makers, 
they have to be offered an incentive. But at the same time they 
have to be threatened by competition. Two points emerge out of 
these considerations which are raised by J.M. BURNS (chapter 3):
(i) in view of the functions a market has to fulfill, information­
al efficiency is only one, although important, element of a wider 
concept of market efficiency and (ii) the institutional framework 
of trading and the design of the tradeable contracts can be con­
sidered as controlling variables with respect to the effectiveness 
of competition.
To assess competing theoretical propositions empirically 
has proved to be difficult. First, the available statistical 
information is partly inadequate, as explained by B.S. YAMEY 
(chapter 2). Second, the inference from the observable price, 
volume and participation data to the unobservable expectations 
and information of traders has to overcome analytical obstacles 
(section 2.2.). Third, the application of econometric methods 
has problems of its own, as demonstrated by S.J. TAYLOR (chapter 
7). Given these difficulties, the experimental method presented 
by D. FRIEDMAN, G.W. HARRISON and J.W. SALMON (chapter 6) could 
help to improve the empirical assessment of rival theories. The 
improvement would result primarily from the characteristic pro­
perty of the experimental method of allowing individual influences 
to be isolated. This is already demonstrated by the forementioned 




























































































environment results can be observed which come quite close to 
those of the conventional equilibrium analyses. It would now 
be particularly interesting to trace the consequences of a 
change in the experimental design by allowing for event un­
certainty and a stochastic inflow of information.
3. Managing futures trading: the perspectives of business
and government
3.1. Investment strategies and risk management
Futures markets can be approached from two basic business 
perspectives which, however, can be and are frequently merged 
as emphasized in the discussion of trading motives (section 2.1.) :
. the search for unexploited profit opportunities including 
tax considerations and
. the attempt to manage risks which are predominantly multi­
dimensional .
The first perspective can be described by asking whether it is 
possible and necessary to forecast prices in order to profit 
from an investment in futures. If the first part of the question 
is reduced to the possibility of forecasting short-term price 
movements from past futures prices, the link between investment 
opportunities and informational efficiency of the weak variety 
becomes visible. The second part of the question concerns the 
skills of market participants to forecast medium-term price 
developments by considering "fundamentals", and the existence of 
a risk premium which would reduce the value of such skills.
As far as short-term price-forecasting is concerned, 
random walk, introduced into futures markets analysis mor 




























































































basic, negative proposition. The statistical models and methods 
which have been developed in the meantime, and to which 
S.J. TAYLOR (chapter 7) has something to add, primarily helped 
to reveal the structure of the on average small and unexploit- 
able deviations from the proposition that consecutive price 
inges are basically unpredictable.
Even if short-term price movements do not deviate in an 
exploitable way from the random-walk, investors may still be 
able to profit from longer-term price changes. The simplest 
possibility would be to exploit price trends with a buy and 
hold strategy. But if such trends exist, do investors or, for 
that matter, speculators, profit merely for bearing the price 
risks that hedgers may want to unload on to the futures markets, 
or do speculators earn profits because they successfully fore­
cast prices? The attempts to settle the question of the relev­
ance of a risk premium have been numerous and made with persis­
tently improved statistical methods. But the results have to be 
qualified, at least, on the following grounds:
. first, there is the forementioned identification problem;
. second, even if one accepts the test's performance so far, 
the available evidence is inconclusive because it varies 
between commodities, contracts, trading periods and ex­
changes;
. third, in the case of (temporarily) thin and hence imper­
fect, markets, speculators may equally well be risk neu­
tral but earn a scarcity rent;
. fourth, even sizeable premia are not necessarily a suffi­
cient indicator of a risk premium because if speculators 
were to be averse to risk, they would, on average, proba­
bly also consider the risk related to a risk premium, i.e. 
its variability.




























































































by S.J. TAYLOR (chapter 7), so far as the results presented in 
his contribution are concerned. The risk premium is necessar­
ily a highly subjective concept. As such and from a modelling 
point of view it must also refer to expectations on the varia­
bility of the premium. Hence efforts to model price formation 
on futures markets in the tradition of KALDOR (1939/40) tend 
to obscure the issue because they rely upon the notions of 
quasi-objective "representative" price expectations and a (cons­
tant) risk premium to accomodate speculators.
Turning to the second business perspective, risk management, 
the gap between its oversimplified theoretical conceptionaliza- 
tion and sophisticated business practice has been narrowed some­
what in recent years. This concerns particularly the move away 
from the one-dimensional price risk and the inclusion of quantity 
risk as also exemplified by J.E. ST1GLITZ (chapter 4) and 
D.M. NEWBERY (chapter 9). And that there are even more dimensions 
of risk worth being considered and dependent upon the specific 
situation of a potential hedger is clearly demonstrated by J. ROLFO 
and H. SOSIN (chapter 8). The hedging strategies which they 
discuss also partly serve as a reminder that, via cross-commodity 
hedges, developments on various futures markets and the under­
lying spot markets can be directly linked, thus increasing the 
complexity of their price determination. But a look at the 
conditions underlying the various strategies equally supports the 
verdict that "the differences of opinion and practices as well as 
the intricacies of the variables involved make it all but im­
possible to reduce the outcomes to general rules for the improve­
ment of trading effectiveness" (TEWELES et al, 1977, p. 43).
3.2. Futures trading and public policy
At least four public policy issues can be identified besides 




























































































of futures markets (section 4.2.):
. trading in financial futures as a feedback mechanism 
relevant to monetary policy and debt management;
. trading in futures as a substitute for interventions 
in the underlying commodity markets;
. interventions in futures markets as a substitute for 
interventions in the underlying commodity markets;
. interventions in futures markets in order to improve 
some of the functions of these markets.
Regarding the first issue, hardly any empirical conclusions have 
been established so far. If, for example, futures markets were 
to add to the variability of interest rates, they could create 
a problem for monetary policy to the extent that such signals 
from the financial markets are used for the scaling and timing 
of policy. Similarly, if the monetary theory of exchange rate 
determination contained realistic propositions and if again 
currency futures tended to increase the variability of spot 
exchange rates, an undesirable side-effect of futures trading 
would have to be taken into account. But as far as the latter 
point is concerned, there is also the argument put forward by 
B. BROWN (chapter 10) that currency futures are not likely to 
add very much to the responsiveness of currency markets given the 
dominant and comparatively efficient interbank forward market.
In any case, the possible undersirable feedbacks on monetary 
policy depend on the relationship between the presence of futures 
trading and the volatility or variability of spot prices. The 
question has received considerable attention with respect to both 
commodity and financial futures. There are good a priori grounds 
for supposing that futures trading does not increase price volati­
lity; and the empirical evidence seems to bear this out. But the 
question cannot be definitely settled with the help of conventional 




























































































problem also has to be assessed from a wider cost-benefit point 
of view. Against possible but hardly substantiated negative 
feedbacks on monetary policy have to be set the private and 
public benefits provided by futures markets, emphasized, for 
example, by J.M. BURNS (chapter 3). And last but not least it 
seems reasonable to ask whether the problem would not become 
negligible in any case if there were to be a changeover from 
the observable, partly erratic monetary policy and the monetary 
shocks resulting from fiscal activism to a more steady conduct 
of macroeconomic policy.
The second issue, futures trading as a substitute for inter­
ventions in commodity markets, is of particular importance as 
regards various price stabilization schemes put forward in the 
discussion of a new international economic order. In this context, 
the results obtained by D.M. NEWBERY (chapter 9) have to be 
emphasized. He shows that, in general, futures markets are likely 
to offer better insurance to producers than price stabilization 
schemes, as long as, and to the extent that, futures markets can 
be made and kept highly competitive. And this condition, quite 
contrary to widespread prejudice, requires sufficient speculation. 
The comparative advantage futures trading has over price stabi­
lization schemes largely results from (i) the discretion it gives 
to the potential hedger, also allowing him to take into account 
a possible quantity risk, and (ii) the production incentives which 
may become distorted with the operation of price stabilization 
schemes. A normative implication of using futures markets ins­
tead of price stabilization schemes may also be worth pointing 
out, namely that producers of the commodities in question should 
handle the marketing side of their business like any other producer, 
trader or manufacturer.
The remaining two policy issues, intervening in futures 
markets either as a substitute for interventions in the under­




























































































of futures markets, are particularly well exemplified by two 
proposals made by HOUTBARKER (1967, p. 51) and McKINNON (.1967 , 
p. 851). The proposals serve well to demonstrate that even 
well-intended interventions in futures markets are likely to 
be counterproductive.
According to HOUTHAKKER, a Commodity Stabilization Agency 
would be established to operate in futures markets under the 
following rules:
. Interventions would be guided by a so-called Indicator 
Price representing a three year moving average of com­
modity spot prices.
. Interventions via buying or selling of futures contracts 
are supposed to induce private storage to the extent that 
spot prices are kept within a range to be established 
around the Indicator Price.
. Interventions would be restricted to contracts six to nine 
months from maturity.
The scheme would operate as follows. If the spot price tended to 
fall below the floor of the price range, the Agency would have to 
buy futures contracts. Such purchases would have to produce a 
positive difference between futures and spot price (contango) 
large enough to induce a withdrawal of supplies via short carry­
ing-charge hedging and also to attract additional demand via 
arbitrage. Hence the spot price would be supported through 
induced private decisions to increase stocks. Conversely, if 
spot prices tended to rise above the ceiling, a negative differ­
ence between futures and spot price (backwardation) would have 
to be produced. By selling contracts, demand for stockholding 
purposes would be discouraged whereas additional supplies would 
be attracted, leading to a reduction of private stocks. The 
price incentives given through a manipulation of some more dis­




























































































decisions similar to those a buffer stock authority would have to 
make in order to stabilize spot prices; consequently, the finan­
cial burden of the stockholding operations would be shifted to 
private market participants.
A first limitation of this proposal is rather obvious. Like 
buffer stock arrangements, it is only applicable to continuous 
inventory markets and inapplicable to non-inventory markets. With 
respect to discontinuous inventory markets, qualifications would 
be necessary in respect of the period during which practically 
no stocks are held. Furthermore, the possibility of attracting, 
if necessary, additional supplies is rather limited towards the 
end of the storage season. The latter point leads to a more 
general argument. The possibility of putting pressure on spot 
prices is limited by the size of private stocks held. In terms 
of the proposal, this means that, against its original intentions, 
the Agency might be drawn into holding stocks in order for it to 
be able to step in with spot sales should insufficient private 
supplies not be coming forward when needed (RICHARDSON and FARRIS, 
1973, p. 229).
A further problem results from the declared intention to 
restrict interventions to contracts six to nine months from 
maturity. There are side-effects to be taken into account.
These result from the interdependence among the prices of all the 
contract maturities traded. Those prices which are directly 
manipulated may easily induce hedging, arbitrage and spreading 
operations affecting contracts of other maturities as well. 
Basically, such transactions would be profitable as long as 
intertemporal price spreads prevail which differ from the corres­
ponding costs of storage. But such transactions would also affect 
the spot price. This could mean that consecutive interventions 
in the selected contracts would be required; however, these might 
not be sufficient to control spot prices (TOMEK and GRAY, 1970, 




























































































to other contracts as well, making the job of the Agency diffi­
cult if not impossible.
Doubts can also be raised as to the predictive quality of 
the Indicator Price. If the likely price trend could be detec­
ted so easily by using the suggested or any similar method of 
extrapolation, it is very likely that private market participants 
would already be using it successfully. In this case interventions 
along the same lines would hardly pay. But there are also some 
technical problems involved. The smoothing effect of the moving 
average depends upon how well deviations from the trend even out 
over the period considered. And from this point of view the length 
of the period required is very likely to differ among commodities. 
Furthermore, it is uncertain whether the pattern of fluctuation 
would remain the same in the future. As to the trend which has 
to be isolated by this method, the results are different for a 
linear trend and a non-linear trend. In the latter case, the 
method can only provide a linear approximation. The quality of 
the apDroximation tends to vary according to the polynomial 
applicable to the trend. Finally, the predictive quality also 
depends upon how speedily changes in the trend are indicated.
A lagged response is practically unavoidable, and it will be 
greater the more observations of past spot prices are included.
Hence the requirements as to smoothing can conflict with those 
conducive to signalling a change in the trend.
It is also uncertain how private market participants will 
behave, given the Agency's planned interventions. They could 
continue to adjust to the now manipulated market conditions. 
Alternatively, speculators could find it profitable to anticipate 
likely future interventions to the Agency according to the 
market information available to them. In this case, one possib­
ility is that the amount of intervention would be reduced, al­




























































































1973, p. 229). But a priori, it is also possible that the amount
of intervention registered would increase. If, for example, the
Indicator Price follows trend changes with a noticeable lag,
informed speculators would have almost riskless opportunities to
take advantage of the lagged response of the Agency which would
£
have to defend its Indicator Price . Furthermore, it can be
argued that traders in the actual commodity would be inclined to
economize their stocks and reduce or even stop hedging, given the
announced stabilization of spot prices (and confidence that it
would be achieved). Consequently, commercial transactions in
futures i.e. hedging, might decline. However, according to the
available evidence, they appear to be the basis for financial7transactions, i.e. speculation . Hence the market volume attri­
butable to private participants might shrink even further. This 
tendency could be aggravated if KEYNES (1930, Vol. 2, p. 141) was 
to be proven correct in expecting that only relatively large 
variations of spot prices attract a sufficient amount of specu­
lation. All this could mean that, if the Agency proved to be 
sucessful in stabilizing spot prices, it would serve eventually 
to destroy, or at least debilitate, the basis for its own inter­
ventions, viz the futures market.
Whether HOUTHAKKER's stabilization scheme would at least 
have a sucessful start can also be questioned. Ex post simulat­
ions of the market for soybeans over a period of 14 years led 
to the conclusion that the volatility of spot prices would tend 
to be increased under a HOUTHAKKER regime, changes in private 
market participants' behaviour being excluded. According to this 
study, the main reason for the failure of the scheme seemed to be 
that the three years moving average imposed "backward looking 
trends" of futures prices and quantities.
Turning to McKINNON's proposal, it would be the task of the 
Commodity Authority to ensure that "distant futures prices are 
stable and do reflect the long-term trend in spot prices" 




























































































prices free to vary. Any stabilizing effect on spot prices is 
considered to be only a welcome side-effect, and not the major 
objective of interventions in futures trading. Hence one of 
the criticisms raised against HOUTHAKKER's proposal does not 
apply here. The Authority is not likely to be drawn into any 
storage operations against its original intentions. However, 
again reservations have to be made according to the storability 
of the commodities in question. In the case of continuous 
inventory markets the interdependence of futures and spot prices 
has to be taken into account. If the Authority simply controlled 
distant futures prices, probably mainly by taking long positions, 
this would block any feedback of spot-price developments on those 
futures prices. Only near-term futures contracts would be affec­
ted, with the risk of causing distortions in the intertemporal 
price-spreads. And this would add to the volatility of spot 
prices via induced private transactions. Under these circum­
stances the proposal is more applicable to discontinuous and non­
inventory markets where the relationship between spot and futures 
prices is less stringent.
As in HOUTHAKKER's proposal, it is uncertain how private 
market participants will react to the activities of the Auth­
ority. But an even more important problem appears to be how 
the Authority would make sure that it inserted the "right" long­
term trend. McKINNON assumes that the Authority could solve 
this information problem. With growing experience, it is supposed 
"to learn to discern a secular trend in distant futures prices 
by the size of the net long position it had to take in order to 
support a target price". And "secular changes in prices will be 
modest in size to which the Authority should accommodate itself 
to avoid supporting any longterm disequilibrium price". (McKINNON 
1967, p. 859). The first expectation is hardly justified in the 
case of continuous inventory markets. Because of the interrelated 
ness of spot and futures prices, the Authority could easily be 




























































































futures market; admittedly this can be assumed away by attribut­
ing sufficient experience to the Authority. The second expect­
ation cuts both ways. Even if secular price changes were modest, 
it could prove difficult to isolate them because of this very 
property. Hence the Authority could hold on too long to a 
wrongly estimated price trend.
The last point leads to the question of the kind of infor­
mation the price trend should be based on, apart from the size 
of the net long position. It can at least be doubted whether a 
public agency would be able to achieve more than is done by 
numerous private market participants in collecting and using 
information relevant to the future. Or to put is in more general 
terms: "the real issue which is thereby posed is whether specu­
lation should be done by private traders or official agencies, 
or by some combination of the two". (GRAY and RUTLEDGE, 1971, 
p. 81) .
Finally, a policy which involves the establishment of more 
distant futures contracts have most currently available can be 
questioned altogether. First, it may be doubted whether there 
really is a strong demand for longer term contracts. To be able 
to lock in one single price over a long period may be counter­
productive in view of the fact that market participants are un­
able to control in a similar way all, or at least many, of the 
other input and output prices which help to determine the pro­
fitability of their economic activities. Second, even if it 
could ever be shown that private risk aversion is greater than 
desired by society, with the likely effect of shortening the 
average time span covered by futures contracts, the priorities 
for economic policy can be considered to be different. Instead 
of trying to intervene in futures markets with highly dubious 
sucess it may be worthwhile to explore possibilities which could 
lower the risk burden. And a considerable part of this burden 




























































































4• Monitoring futures trading; issues of promotion and
regulation
4.1. Promoting futures trading
The successes and the failures in launching new and sus­
taining old futures contracts and in opening new and expanding 
traditional exchanges with diverging institutional infrastruc­
tures during the past fifteen years invite us to ask again what 
are the pre-conditions for successful futures trading. Besides 
adding to positive economic knowledge, the answers to the ques­
tion are important from two points of view:
. Futures trading has definitely passed the stage of pre­
dominantly spontaneous development and has become an 
industry with "products" introduced, managed, and diver­
sified by the exchanges. Hence the answers are of ins­
trumental value to the competitors, actual and potential, 
in this comparatively new industry.
. Futures markets have grown to a size which in many cases 
is of considerable importance to the underlying spot 
markets and which involves a wide-ranging market partici­
pation. As a consequence governments have been induced 
to consider and reconsider the regulation of such markets 
an activity which requires sufficient knowledge if the 
markets are not to be inadvertedly and unnecessarily cri­
ppled by public policy.
The answers relevant to the two points of view basically 
refer to the two sides of the same coin, liquidity of the market 
and effective competition. The need for public regulation is 
largely a question of how to induce and to safeguard effective 
competition in futures trading (cf. section 4.2.); and it be­
comes redundant when this has come about. For the futures indus 




























































































to attract and sustain sufficient liquidity. And as already 
indicated (section 2.3.), the system of incentives to trade can 
be considered as a controlling variable.
The incentive system can be split into two components, (i) 
the underlying commodity or financial instrument and its pro­
perties, and (ii) the institutional infrastructure provided by 
the futures contract and the trading arrangements. As pointed 
out by D.J.S. RUTLEDGE (chapter 12), both components have recei­
ved different analytical attention in the past, with the emphasis 
moving towards the institutional characteristics of futures mar­
kets. He also demonstrates that, on an international scale, the 
characteristics show a remarkable diversity. Furthermore, and 
as reported by R.L. SANDOR and H.B. SOSIN (chapter 11), the method 
of trial and error still ranks high when it comes to determining 
the provisions of a contract such as contract size, "tick" size, 
daily price limit, position limit size and deliverable grades.
It may well be that the choice of the most attractive provisions 
is one of the areas where technical and hence systematic know­
ledge has to be combined with ingenuity and possibly flair.
A further unsettled question concerning the incentive system 
is the assessment of floor trading. There seems to be a consensus 
that floor brokers add liquidity to a market. Their presence or 
absence serves, for example, at least as a partial explanation of 
differences in liquidity and - possibly - informational efficiency 
between American and English markets for the same commodity. But 
this additional liquidity comes at a price. As argued by J.M. BURNS 
(chapter 3), floor brokers find themselves in a priviledged posi­
tion compared with other market participants when it comes to the 
speed at which orders can be executed. Hence they enjoy an ins­
titutionally determined competitive advantage in the exploitation 
of trading opportunities arising out of new information. Further­
more, a minimum return is provided to them depending, as shown 




























































































It may well be that these selective incentives on balance still 
create net benefits by attracting additional trade and trading 
skills, given the present organisation of exchanges. But it 
remains to be explored whether an organisational innovation 
like electronic trading may not allow the striking of an even 
more favourable balance between incentives to trading and 
the strength of competition.
4.2. Regulation and market performance
As with all other economic activities, the performance of 
futures markets can be assessed on allocative and distributive 
criteria. Even if the result of such an assessment were to 
support government regulation in principle, rationality would 
require us to weigh carefully the likely benefits of regulation 
against the cost to be incurred. Assessment requires the follow­
ing :
. an operational reference system which allows a comparison 
between actual performance and possible performance,
. solid empirical evidence to establish deviations between 
actual and possible performance,
. courses of regulatory action which, according to a priori 
reasoning and relevant experience, are likely to be effect­
ive in terms of reducing or removing such deviations,
. estimates of the direct costs of regulation in terms of 
resources required as well as an evaluation of possible 
side-effects of regulatory action.
Only too frequently one or even several of these requirements for 
a rational policy conduct are violated.
To date, public opinion on the functions and the performance 




























































































markets than for stock exchanges. Hence arguments for their 
regulation, or even prohibition receive wide spread support 
only too easily. Among arguments put forward in favour of 
regulation three are particularly popular: (i) dangers of
price manipulation, (ii) additional price volatility due to 
speculation, and (iii) losses imposed upon inexperienced 
traders. Whilst the last argument is purely distributive, the 
first two suggest market failure with allocative and distri­
butive consequences.
As far as manipulation and price volatility are concerned, 
it is important to note at the outset that it proved to be 
extremely difficult to muster unambiguous empirical evidence.
As regards manipulation, the results presented by G.T. GEMMILL 
(chapter 13) reaffirm previous findings. They can be summari­
zed in terms of the verdict of CAGAN (1981, pp. 173, 174) refer­
ring to interest rate futures markets: (i) "...the bugaboo of
corners should be laid to rest. Although their possibility 
always seems to cast an ominous shadow over futures markets, 
corners are almost never achieved". (ii) "Most squeezes pro­
bably reflect fortuitous developments rather than intended 
manipulation".
Turning to the alleged additional volatility of futures and 
spot prices due to speculation on organized futures markets, the 
proposition had already been questioned when dealing with the 
more general issue whether futures trading has a destabilizing 
impact on prices (section 3.2.). Furthermore, destabilizing 
speculation is difficult to reconcile with the predominant 
finding that prices on liquid futures markets can be reasonably 
closely described in terms of the random walk model. If price 
changes turn out to be basically unpredictable, they indicate 
that the market participants have not missed significant oppor­
tunities to profit from informational advantages. As an un­
intended (external) effect of their competitive trading, prices 




























































































drive prices off this efficiency "walk" would simply invite 
losses, except when such efforts turn out to be consistent with 
future developments so far unknown to anybody. This does not 
exclude the possibility that the efforts themselves may be 
undertaken at random (CAGAN, 1981, p. 178). But it is difficult 
to see them as a major but still random component in price deter­
mination. Even the proposition of overshooting, which refers to 
a sequence of price changes as a whole and not to individual 
consecutive changes, has less empirical force than a simple ins­
pection of futures prices may frequently suggest. As shown as 
early as 1934 by WORKING, a random walk can be quite consistent 
with a price series which seems to suggest a systematic cyclical 
component.
As far as inexperienced but nevertheless avaricious market 
participants are concerned, they may well be responsible for 
some of the random changes in prices and may have to take losses 
which necessarily must be profits to others. But it is difficult 
to see that such redistribution should require any regulation 
going beyond protection against criminal acts like fraud. First 
of all, the possible implication that experience is a sufficient 
safeguard against losses cannot be reconciled with imperfect 
information and uncertainty. Second, nobody has forced inexper­
ienced market participants to engage in trading. Hence they may 
well be left to bear the full responsibility of that freedom of 
action as is done in other cases of economic activity. Third, losses 
resulting from poor decisions can be a better teacher than 
paternalistic regulation.
But even if it be accepted that market participants should 
be protected from their own imprudence, what form should such 
protection take? In order to be effective, more than public 
warnings and the provision of information would be required.
Most likely, such regulation would have to assign to brokers the 




























































































be defined? Where is the borderline to be drawn between prudent 
and imprudent trading decisions? Who is to supervise the perfor­
mance of brokers and who is to audit the supervisors? The likely 
outcome would be a regulatory chain of little effectiveness in 
terms of protection but with stifling consequences for futures 
trading. If there is to be any protection of inexperienced trad­
ers, it has to come from the brokers themselves acting in their 
own interest. And it can well be argued that they have an inter­
est in advising their customers well, particularly as they have 
to offer their services, including their advice, under competitive 
conditions. Furthermore, the exchanges have an interest in order­
ly relationships between their members and the members' clients. 
Hence feasible safeguards have been introduced over time into the 
self-regulation of the exchanges.
Self-regulation and public regulation also are substitutes 
when it comes to preventing manipulation. This is demonstrated 
by G.T. GEHMILL(chapter 13) who compares the British and American 
practice. And both substitutes seem to be equally ineffective 
in view of the practical difficulties of excluding completely 
(temporary) concentration as a precondition for manipulation. 
However, particularly in view of the competition between the 
various exchanges, which no longer stops at national borders, it 
can be argued that exchanges and their members have an interest 
in maintaining orderly trading conditions in general and protec­
ting their clients in particular. This does not exclude, on the 
other hand, the possibility that they are inclined to tolerate 
monopolistic elements in the trading organization and in contract 
design as a source of revenues for their members - as is argued, 
for example, by J.M. BURNS (chapter 3). But it is difficult to 
see that frequent and substantiated complaints of monopolistic 
trading practices on an exchange would leave its volume of trans­
actions unaffected.



























































































the exchanges are unlikely to extend regulation beyond codifying 
and generalizing common practice, because such extension would 
merely increase the costs of using these markets. Such restraint 
cannot be expected from government regulation, where an extension 
of regulation is more compatible with the production incentives 
of bureaucracies weakly checked by budget constraints. And given 
the limited effectiveness of both private and public regulation, 
the harsh verdict of STIGLER (1975, p. 177) may serve as a useful 
reminder whenever one is tempted to strive for perfection through 
regulation: "Public regulation, for all its enormous momentum, 
lives by its goals and not by its achievements, and surely we 




























































































F O O T N O T E S
1. Corresponding evidence has been provided, for example, for 
the International Monetary Market (IMM) in Chicago by the 
1977 survey of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC). (cf. International Commodities Clearing House,
1979, Appendix V).
2. Notable exceptions are quite early contributions like the 
one by HOFFMAN (1932) , who emphasizes (p. 407) : "that hed­
ging is something more than simply setting up counter future 
transactions and hoping for the best". And his definition 
of hedging (pp. 405 ff.) correspondingly includes expect­
ations as to basis changes as a constitutive element.
3. For a discussion of the taxation aspects of futures trading 
with reference to U.S. Laws and regulations cf. POWERS and 
VOGEL (1981, chapter 19).
4. For a more detailed discussion see STREIT, 1982.
5. For a summary cf. STREIT (1981, pp. 495 ff).
6. To skilled chartists, such technical shortcomings of the 
intervention scheme would be quickly revealed. If the 
Agency tried to frustrate speculative trading by frequently 
changing the scheme, this would presumably be counterpro­
ductive to the stabilization objective.
7. Studies relating hedging and speculation suggest that, when 
measured in terms of open contracts, the total amount of 
business done on a futures market tends to vary fairly 
closely with the amount of hedging contracts outstanding 
and not so much according to those open contracts attribut­
able to speculation (e.g. WORKING, 1970, pp. 14). In 
addition, according to the history of individual futures 
markets, no cases are known where speculative motives rather 
than the desire to shift commercial risks were the driving 
force to open such a market.
8. According to RICHARDSON and FARRIS (op. cit.) who claim to 
have used as indicators for the total market values for the 
elesticity of demand and supply which are even rather favour­
able when taking into account the operation of the scheme.
9. For a wider discussion of the time horizon in futures markets 
























































































































































































GOSS AND GILES , 1981








R E F E R E N C E S
: P. CAGAN, Financial Futures Markets - Is more Regula­
tion Needed? Journal of Futures Markets, 1, 1981.
: S. FIGLEWSKI, Market 'Efficiency' in a Market with 
Heterogeneous Information, Journal of Political 
Economy, 86, 1978.
: B.A . GOSS, D.E.A. GILES, Comparative Modelling of 
Price Determination and Storage in United States and 
Australian Commodity Markets: Soybeans and Wool,
Paper presented to the Western Economic Association 
International Conference, San Francisco, July 2-6, 81.
: R.W. GRAY, D.J.S. RUTLEDGE, The Economics of Commodity 
Futures Markets - A Survey, Review of Marketing and 
Agricultural Economics, 39, 1971.
: S.J. GROSSMAN, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock 
Markets where Traders have Diverse Information, Jour­
nal of Finance, 31, 1976.
: S.J. GROSSMAN, J.E. STIGLITZ, On the Impossibility of 
Informationally Efficient Markets, American Economic 
Review, 70, 1980.
: R.G. HAWTREY, Mr. Kaldor on the Forward Market, Review 
of Economic Studies, 7, 1939/40.
: J. HIRSHLEIFER, Speculation and Equilibrium: Informa­
tion, Risk, and Markets, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
89, 1975.
: J. HIRSHLEIFER, The Theory of Speculation under Alter­









































































































W.G. HOFFMAN, Futures Trading upon Organized Commodity 
Markets in the United States, Philadelphia, 1932.
H.S. HOUTHAKKER, Economic Policy for the Farm Sector, 
Washington D.C., 1967.
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES CLEARING HOUSE LTD, Financial 
Futures in Britain?, London, 1979.
L.L. JOHNSON, The Theory of Heging and Speculation in 
Commodity Futures, Review of Economic Studies, 27, 1960.
N. KALDOR, A Note on the Theory of the Forward Market, 
Review of Economic Studies, 7, 1939/40.
J.M. KEYNES, A Treatise on Money, 2 V ols., London, 1930.
L.M. LACHMANN, Austrian Economics in the Present Crisis 
of Economic Thought, in: L.M. Lachmann (edited with an 
Introduction by W.E. Grinder), Capital, Expectations 
and the Market Process, Essays on the Theory of the 
Market Economy, Mento Park, California, 1977.
: R.I. Me KINNON, Futures Markets, Buffer Stocks, and 
Income Stability for Primary Producers, Journal of 
Political Economy, 75, 1967.
: M.H. PESTON, B.S. YAMEY, Inter-Temporal Price Relation­
ships with Forward Markets: A Method of Analysis, 
Economica, 27-29, 1960.
: K.R. POPPER, Prediction and Prophecy in the Social 
Sciences, Library on the 10th International Congress 
of Philosophy, vol. 1, 1948 reprinted in: K.R. Popper,
Conjectures and Refutations - The Growth of Scientific 






































































































TEWELES et al. ,
: K.R. POPPER, On the Sources of Knowledge and Ignorance, 
Proceedings of the British Academy, 1960; reprinted in:
K.R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations - The Growth 
of Scientific Knowledge, Henley - on - Thames, fourth 
edition, Reprint 1976, pp. 3-30.
: M. POWERS, D. VOGEL, Inside the Financial Futures 
Markets, New York, 1981.
: R.A. RICHARDSON, P.L. FARRIS, Farm Commodity Price
Stabilization through Futures Markets, American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, 55, 1973.
: D.J.S. RUTLEDGE, Hedgers Demand for Futures Contracts:
A Theoretical Framework with Applications to the 
United States Soybean Complex, Food Rexearch Institute 
Studies, 10, 1972.
: G.J. STIGLER (1975), Regulation: The Confusion of Means 
and Ends, in: G.J. Stigler, The Citizen and the State - 
Essays on Regulation, Chicago, 1975.
: M.E. STREIT, On the Use of Futures Markets for Stabili­
zation Purposes, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 116,
1 9 8 1.
: M.E. STREIT, Information Processing in Futures Markets - 
An Essay on the Adequacy of Abstraction, European 
University Institute, Working Paper No. 9, 1982.
: M.E. STREIT, Heterogene Erwartungen, Preisbildung und 
Informationseffizienz auf spekulativen Markten (Hetero­
geneous Expectations, Price Formation and Informational 
Efficiency on Speculative Markets), Zeitschrift fur 
die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 139, 1983.
: R.J . TEWELES, C .V . HARLOW, H .L . STONE, The Commodi ty 
Futures Game - Who Wins? Who Loses? Why? abridged 




























































































T'OMEK AND GRAY, 197 0 : H.G. TOMEK, R.W. GRAY, Temporal Relationships Among
Prices on Commodity Futures Markets: Their Allocation 
and Stabilizing Roles, American Journal of Agricul­





H. WORKING, A Random Difference Series for Use in 
the Analysis of Time Series, Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 29, 1934.
H. WORKING, Quotations on Commodity Futures as Price 
Forecasts, Econometrica, 1, 1942.
H. WORKING, The Investigation of Economic Expectations, 
American Economic Review, 39, 1949.
H. WORKING, Economic Functions of Futures Markets, in: 




























































































A N N E X
FUTURES MARKETS -
MODELLING, MANAGING, AND MONITORING FUTURES TRADING 
Manfred E. Streit, editor
TAELE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1 Modelling, Managing, and Monitoring 
Futures Trading - Frontiers of 
analytical inquiry 
Manfred E. Streit
Chapter 2 The Economics of Futures Trading: Some 
notes and queries 
Basil S. Yamey
Chapter 3 Futures Markets and Market Efficiency 
Joseph M. Burns
Chapter 4 Futures Markets and Risk: A general 
equilibrium approach 
Joseph E. Stiglitz
Chapter 5 Interest Rate Futures Markets, Interest 
Rate Variability and the Demand for 
Investment
David Levhari and Michael Rothschild
Chapter 6 The Informational Role of Futures Markets 
and Learning Behaviour - Some experimental 
evidence
Daniel Friedman, Glenn W. Harrison and 
Jon W. Salmon
Chapter 7 Trading Rules for Investors in Apparently 


































































































Alternative Strategies for Hedging 
and Spreading
Jacques Rolfo and Howard B. Sosin
Futures Trading, Risk Reduction and Price
Stabilisation
David M. Newbery
The Swap Market and its Relation to 
Currency Forward and Futures Markets 
Brendan Brown
Inventive Activity in Futures Markets: 
A case study of the development of the 
first interest rate futures market 
Richard L. Sandor and Howard B. Sosin
The Establishment of an Interest Rate 
Futures Market - The experience of the 
Sydney Futures Exchange 
David J.S. Rutledge
Regulating Futures Markets: A review in






























































































MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
NO. 1 JACQUES PELKMANS
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE NEWLY 
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
NO. 3 ALDO RUSTICHINI
SEASONALITY IN EURODOLLAR INTEREST RATES
No. 9 MANFRED E. STREIT
INFORMATION PROCESSING IN FUTURES MARKETS - 
AN ESSAY ON THE ADEQUACY OF ABSTRACTION
No. 10 KUMARASWAMY VELUPILLAI
WHEN WORKERS SAVE AND INVEST: SOME CALDORIAN 
DYNAMICS
No. 11 KUMARASWAMY VELUPILLAI
A NEO-CAMBRIDGE MODEL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
AND UNEMPLOYMENT
No. 12 KUMARASWAMY VELUPILLAI - GUGLIELMO CHIODI 
ON LINDAHL’S THEORY OF DISTRIBUTION
No. 22 DON PATINKIN*
PAUL A. SAMUELSON AND MONETARY THEORY
NO. 2 3 MARCELLO DE CECCO
INFLATION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE 
EURODOLLAR MARKET
No. 24 MARCELLO DE CECCO
THE VICIOUS/VIRTUOUS CIRCLE DEBATE IN THE 
'20S AND THE '70S
No. 26 DOMENICO MARIO NUTI
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN EASTERN EUROPE - PROSPECTS 
AND REPERCUSSIONS
Part-time professor, spring 1982
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
